_November, 1872._—Jay Gould was arrested on criminal charges based on his management of the Erie Railroad. He surrendered securities, the face value of which was more than $9,000,000, in December.—Northwestern was cornered. It opened Nov. 20 at 83¾ and closed at 95. On Thursday it sold at 100, and at the close on Friday 200 was bid. On Saturday buying in under the rule ran the price up to 230. The settlement was made on the following Tuesday, when the price declined to par, the highest bid made being 85. Jay Gould, Horace F. Clark and Augustus Schell conducted the corner, while the cornered were Drew and Henry N. Smith. It was one of the most profitable corners ever made in Wall Street.
_February, 1873._—There was a noted corner in Northwestern.
_April, 1873._—The preliminary panic of the year occurred in this month. The stock market was uneasy. The failure of a firm of silk importers was followed by that of Barker & Allen, the members of which were related to Vanderbilt. Three other firms also failed. Confidence returned and quiet prevailed until the 26th, when the Atlantic Bank failed. This brought about another depression, which was followed by a quick rally.
_May, 1873._—Heavy break in Pacific Mail. The further retirement of greenbacks was prohibited by Congress.
_August, 1873._—Fraud was discovered in the issue of certain bonds of the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad.
_September, 1873._—The New York Warehouse & Security Company failed on the 8th; Kenyon, Cox & Co., in which Daniel Drew was a special partner, on the 13th; Jay Cooke & Co. on the 18th, and Fisk & Hatch on the 19th. Innumerable brokers failed. There were runs on the Fourth National Bank and the Union Trust Company. The secretary of the company was a defaulter to the extent of $500,000, and its doors were closed. The Bank of the Commonwealth failed. There was a panic in the stock market, and the excitement ran so high that the Governing Committee closed the Exchange at 11 o’clock on Saturday, the 20th. The Gold Exchange Bank was unable to effect all the clearances, and dealers were unable to get their balances. The result was the temporary suspension of some dozen firms. The Gold Exchange Bank having been enjoined by the courts from making the clearances, the Bank of New York undertook the job and failed in it. Next a committee of 20 was appointed to do the work, but it failed also, because Smith, Gould & Martin refused to render a statement to it. The final settlements were made between members themselves. Smith, Gould & Martin, with contracts amounting to $9,000,000, settled on a basis of 135. Business was resumed on Sept. 30.
_December, 1873._—The Credit Mobilier was organized for the construction of the Union Pacific Railroad. It was composed of stockholders of the railway company, and had a capital of $3,750,000. Profits were large, and the stock was quoted at 400. Certain Congressmen were given stock at par on their personal notes, the object being to gain their favor in case adverse legislation was proposed. Oakes Ames, of Massachusetts, was expelled from the House for his connection with the bribery, and James Brooks, of New York, for accepting bribes. Other Congressmen were censured. A proposition to impeach Vice-President Colfax was reported against by the Judiciary Committee.
_January, 1874._—The value of the pound sterling was fixed by Congress at $4.86.65.
_February, 1874._—Two letters, purporting to come from the Wabash and Western Union companies, were received by the Stock Exchange, announcing an increase of stock by the directors. The market went off three points before it was discovered that the letters were forgeries.
_April, 1874._—The President’s veto of the inflation bill unsettled prices and caused depression. The bears raided the market, causing a heavy decline, but a quick recovery followed.
_February, 1875._—Wabash went in the hands of a receiver.
_May, 1875._—A receiver for Erie was appointed.
_July, 1875._—Duncan, Sherman & Co. failed.
_August, 1875._—The Bank of California failed. Cashier Ralston committed suicide.
_March, 1876._—Jay Gould made his famous attack on Western Union.
_April, 1876._—The National Bank of the State of New York failed.
_November, 1876._—Many savings banks failed.
_January, 1877._—Commodore Vanderbilt died on the 4th.
_February, 1877._—Jersey Central went into the hands of a receiver.
_July, 1877._—Great railway strikes; rioting and incendiarism in Baltimore and Pittsburgh; losses $10,000,000. Over 100,000 laboring men took part in the movement.
_January, 1878._—The Vanderbilt combination, including Michigan Central, Lake Shore and Canada Southern, was made in this month.
_February, 1878._—The purchase of silver bullion by the Government to the amount of $2,000,000 to $4,000,000 per month, and its coinage into legal tender dollars, was ordered by Congress on the 28th.
_May, 1878._—Congress passed the Resumption Act.
_January, 1879._—Specie payments were resumed after the suspension which took place soon after the opening of the war of the rebellion.
_April, 1879._—Gould and Field combined, and under their auspices the St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern and Wabash Railways were consolidated. Gould already had control of Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific, and afterward secured control of Missouri Pacific and Denver & Rio Grande.
_June, 1879._—Western Union declared a scrip dividend of 17 per cent.
_August, 1879._—There was a serious tumble in prices in this month.
_October, 1879._—The stock market was very active in October and November. The bull movement of the year was at its height and transactions were so numerous that it was impossible to record them all. The drop came in November.
_November, 1879._—William H. Vanderbilt sold 250,000 shares of New York Central & Hudson River stock at 120 to a syndicate headed by J. S. Morgan & Co., of London. Early in the following year the same syndicate took 100,000 shares on the same terms.
_May, 1880._—Philadelphia & Reading Railway and Coal and Iron Company failed. There was a flurry in the stock market in consequence.
_June, 1880._—A scrip dividend of 100 per cent. to the holders of Rock Island stock on the purchase and consolidation of the Iowa Southern and the Missouri Northern with Rock Island.—A leading German Wall Street banking house, in view of the large exports of gold, offered a premium of 1/2 of 1 per cent. for a call on $1,000,000 gold, the privilege to extend for one year.
_November, 1880._—The Louisville & Nashville declared a 100 per cent. stock dividend.—Western Union declined from 104-7/8, on November 22d, to 77½ on December 17th.—Jay Gould purchased most of the stock of the Denver, South Park & Pacific Railroad, in the following month a large block of Iron Mountain and a majority of the International & Great Northern.
_December, 1880._—Seats in the New York Stock Exchange sold at $25,000. A great number of new securities were listed. So numerous were the combinations, consolidations and extensions of railways that in many cases the analogy with former periods was lost, and comparisons as to earnings were of little value. In 1886 seats in the Exchange sold at $35,000. In December, 1870, when speculation was stagnant and the market was clear of all outsiders, seats sold at $3,000.—B. G. Arnold & Co., the largest coffee importing house of New York, suspended. They were the principals in a combination to corner Java coffee, and met disaster in the attempt.
_January, 1881._—Western Union, American Union and Atlantic & Pacific consolidated. The former company declared a stock dividend of 38¼ per cent. The capital stock was made $80,000,000.
_February, 1881._—Call loans were made at 1 per cent. per day on the 25th.
_May, 1881._—The Gould southwestern railway system was consolidated.
_July, 1881._—President Garfield was shot by Guiteau. The stock market broke on the news of the shooting, and a panic was only prevented by the intervention of Sunday and the National holiday on Monday.—The Oregon war debt was paid.
_August, 1881._—There was heavy speculation in wheat and corn in Chicago and New York. Money became scarce, and call loans were made at interest and commission.
_September, 1881._—The Hannibal & St. Joseph corner.
_January, 1882._—The trunk line railway war of rates was settled.—Gould and Huntington purchased a controlling interest in the St. Louis & San Francisco Railway and half the ownership of the Atlantic & Pacific Railway.
_February, 1882._—The market showed some animation early in 1882, but it soon collapsed and became very weak. Bottom was touched on the 23d, the recovery being based on talk of a settlement of the then existing trunk line rate war.—Richmond & Danville plunged from 219 to 130 and a semi-panic ensued on the Stock Exchange.
_March, 1882._—To allay reports that he was in financial straits, Mr. Gould, on the 13th, displayed his wealth. He took from a tin box $23,000,000 Western Union, $12,000,000 Missouri Pacific, $6,000,000 Manhattan Elevated, $2,000,000 Wabash common, and $10,000,000 bonds of Metropolitan, New York Elevated and Wabash preferred. He offered to show $30,000,000 additional railway stocks, but his visitors had seen enough.
_October, 1882._—A syndicate headed by the late W. H. Vanderbilt purchased 124,800 shares of the common and 140,500 shares of the preferred stock of the New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railway at 13 and 37 respectively. This stock afterwards became the property of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway.
_December, 1882._—The Municipal Bank of Shopin, Russia, failed with liabilities of $60,000,000.—The railway war in the Northwest lasted from September until December 15. On the announcement of the settlement the market improved and the year closed with a better feeling all around.
_February, 1883._—Western Union absorbed Mutual Union by lease, the rental being interest at 6 per cent. on $5,000,000 bonds and 6 per cent. on $2,500,000 stock.
_March, 1883._—A block of Hannibal & St. Joseph stock was sold to Chicago, Burlington & Quincy. At the same time Wabash was leased to Iron Mountain.—From the 19th until the close of the month there was great depression. Money on call loaned at 4@25 per cent. The public was heavily loaded with stocks.
_May, 1883._—Jersey Central was leased to Reading.
_June, 1883._—The National Petroleum Exchange and the New York Mining Stock Exchange consolidated.—McGeoch, Everingham & Co., of Chicago, failed in consequence of an unsuccessful attempt to corner the lard market. The firm lost $6,000,000.—The movement against the circulation of trade dollars at par was begun in Philadelphia and extended throughout the country.
_July, 1883._—Western Union Telegraph operators struck for increased pay. The strike lasted a month and ended in failure.
_October, 1883._—A notable feature of 1883 was the gigantic losses made in speculative operations. The failures of McGeoch, of Chicago, and Ranger, of Liverpool, were notorious instances, but thousands of private individuals were squeezed out by the pressure.—In the summer and fall of this year there had been a shrinkage in prices of stocks, when, in October, the Northern Pacific Company announced a proposed issue of $20,000,000 new bonds. This precipitated a heavy decline in nearly the whole list. The market became largely oversold, when a sharp twist was made in a number of stocks, and prices advanced with great rapidity. Northern Pacific preferred jumped from 56 to 78½ within a few days, and Oregon & Transcontinental went from 34½ to 51. Then Vanderbilt came into the market and put up Michigan Central from 77 to 96½, and the other Vanderbilt stocks to a less extent. Great depression followed this manipulation.
_December, 1883._—The mercantile failures in 1883 amounted to $173,000,000, against $81,000,000 in 1881.—The triple alliance between Union Pacific, Rock Island and St. Paul was made.—Villard resigned from Oregon & Transcontinental and Oregon Railway & Navigation.
_January, 1884._—Firmness in the market on the announcement that a syndicate had made a large loan to Oregon & Transcontinental on the pledge of its stocks. A quick move against the shorts caused a sharp advance.—Henry Villard resigned the presidency of the Northern Pacific Railroad.—John J. Cisco & Co., New York bankers, failed.—The surplus reserve of the New York National banks was wiped out.—James R. Keene, operator in wheat, failed.
_March, 1884._—There was a squeeze in New York Central. It sold up to 122.—Delaware, Lackawanna & Western was cornered, and its price was run up to 133-1/8 regular and 139½ cash. S. V. White managed the pool. Another move in the same stock was made later in the year. The pool closed out at an average of 102. Then the stock dropped to 86¾.
_May 6, 1884._—The Marine Bank failed May 6th, wrecked by Grant & Ward. Grant & Ward suspended two days later.,
_May, 1884._—During the panic the New York banks issued Clearing House certificates to the extent of $24,915,000, of which $7,000,000 went to the Metropolitan Bank. Similar certificates, to the amount of $26,565,000, were issued in the panic of 1873.—The height of the panic was reached on the 14th. The storm had been brewing for nearly three years, but it was in no sense a commercial panic. Stock Exchange values had shrunk to an unparalleled degree, and the crash was precipitated by the developments regarding Grant & Ward, John C. Eno, Fish, of the Marine Bank, and a few others. The disturbance was over by July 1.—The Metropolitan Bank failed. Eno’s frauds on the Second National Bank discovered. George I. Seney failed. The Atlantic Bank failed.
_June, 1884._—The greatest depression following the May panic was reached. Large overselling led to a sharp rally.—Charles Francis Adams, Jr., became president of the Union Pacific.
_August, 1884._—The Wall Street Bank failed.
_November, 1884._—The Metropolitan Bank, on May 15th had $11,294,000 in deposits; on October 1st $1,338,000, and in November it went into liquidation and retired from business.
_December, 1884._—The Lackawanna pool of 1884 closed out its holdings on the 12th, and there being no further support to the market prices declined, and the year closed with much depression.—The largest corn crop ever grown in the United States was that of 1884. It was estimated at 1,800,000,000 bushels.
_January, 1885._—Henry N. Smith, a noted bear operator, failed, and carried down with him the brokerage firm of William Heath & Co.
_November, 1885._—The trunk lines came to an agreement and advanced rates. This gave confidence, and an upward movement was started. The Vanderbilts and the Grangers were the features of the market.
_December, 1885._—Texas Pacific stock collapsed. A receiver was appointed for the property on the suit of the Missouri Pacific, a large holder of its floating debt.—William H. Vanderbilt died suddenly on the 8th. The fact was not known down town until after business hours, but it had a very unsettling influence. The next morning the market opened 1@3 points lower, but the bulls had combined to support prices, and bought freely. In many instances prices were higher at the close than on the previous day.
_February, 1886._—The trans-continental pool was ruptured. The railroads declined to continue to pay the subsidy demanded by Pacific Mail.
_March, 1886._—Western Union declared a scrip dividend of 1½ per cent. for the quarter. The scrip was made convertible into stock, and carried the same rate of interest as the stock.—The representatives of the coal companies met at a dinner party and reached “an agreement among gentlemen” that the anthracite coal production for the year should not exceed 33,250,000 tons.—F. B. Gowen joined the Drexel-Morgan syndicate for the reorganization of Reading. The announcement caused a rapid advance in all coal stocks.—The great strike on the Gould system of railroads, inaugurated on the 7th, failed.—Heavy engagements of gold for shipment abroad were made.
_April, 1886._—Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific were sold in foreclosure.—Labor strikes at their height. The Lake Shore switchmen struck in Chicago, and the Third Avenue horse car drivers in New York. The troubles had a depressing influence on the stock market.
_May, 1886._—Charles Woerishoffer, bear operator, died May 9.—Chicago anarchists attacked the police with bombs, killing and wounding many. Police used revolvers freely and many rioters fell. Anarchists were sentenced to death.—The strike on the Southwestern system was officially declared off on the 1st. The men were completely beaten after a contest of six weeks.—Tasker Marvin, bull operator, failed. Marketing of long stock caused decline. The depression was aided by existing labor troubles.
_June, 1886._—Western Union passed its dividend.
_November, 1886._—The managers of the trunk lines reaffirmed the presidents’ agreement of the previous year to maintain rates.—Richmond & West Point Terminal became very active and strong on the purchase by the company of the control of Richmond & Danville.—There were extraordinary buoyancy and speculative activity in stocks. Low priced non-dividend payers were largely dealt in. One specialty after another was “boomed,” and in some instances large profits were made.
_December, 1886._—About $10,740,000 in gold was imported at New York during the month.—Prices toppled over on the 15th. All kinds of cheap stocks had been boomed by cliques, when, on money becoming tight, there was a rush to realize. Sales reached the unprecedented figure of 1,095,159 shares. The most conspicuous stocks in the decline were Philadelphia & Reading and New York & New England. No financial disaster or failure of importance occurred. There was much uneasiness for several days, but a better feeling soon set in, although speculation was checked by the prevailing high rate for money.—The Inter-State Commerce bill was introduced in Congress.
_January, 1887._—On a report that Hocking Valley had suffered by irregularities of former directors, stock broke 1½ points. The consumption of iron in the United States exceeded that of Great Britain for the first time in 1886. The Inter-State Commerce Bill was passed by the House Jan. 21, by a vote of 5 to 1. European war rumors caused foreign selling and a break in the market of 2 to 5 points. There was a complete recovery on the following day.
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CHAPTER XLVII.
INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BARTHOLDI STATUE.
GREAT AS AN ACHIEVEMENT OF ART, BUT GREATER AS THE EMBODIMENT OF THE IDEA OF UNIVERSAL FREEDOM THE WORLD OVER.—IT IS A POETIC IDEA OF A UNIVERSAL REPUBLIC.—ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE WORLD MUST RESULT IN THE FREEDOM OF MAN.
The following was sent by me to the New York _World_, as briefly embodying my views on Bartholdi’s great work, a few days prior to the dedication of the Statue of Liberty:
“When, several years ago, the gigantic forearm, with the torch in its hand, of the Statue of Liberty was exhibited in Madison square, the people who gazed at it with idle curiosity had little idea that the mammoth structure of which it was a part would so soon be completed, or that it would be so great an achievement as it now stands. Thanks to the New York _World_, which gave the impetus to the subscription fund movement, which enabled the great sculptor to realize the greatest artistic dream of his life within a reasonable period. Some people may imagine that the time has been long, but many people who understood the magnitude of the work, and observed the slowness of the subscriptions, had no hope of seeing it finished in this generation prior to the time the subscription for the pedestal was under way.
“Until the last few days, when this colossal goddess arose on Bedloe’s Island in all her full, finished and magnificent proportions and artistic splendor, like the ancient divinity emerging from the foam of the sea, the people did not begin to realize the magnitude of Bartholdi’s idea. In mere mechanical size the statue with its appurtenances excel anything and everything of the same character in the world. It is the biggest thing of its kind either ancient or modern, and is, therefore, the most appropriate emblem to show forth the evolution and the international and historic associations of the two greatest Republics that the world has yet seen. The Colossus of Rhodes, the great Sphinx and other colossal statues sink into insignificance when compared with the latest production of Bartholdi’s brain.
“But great as the statue is as a work of art, the international idea which it embodies is greater still. When taken in connection with that earlier and comparatively insignificant effort of the same eminent artist, the Statue of Lafayette in Union square, the Colossus of Liberty suggests a whole century of history, replete with greater events than the thousand years which preceded it. In these two statues the interdependence of the two great nations is clearly portrayed, and their destiny as the pioneers of universal Republicanism brought out in bold relief. If Tennyson’s poetic dream of a universal Republic is ever to be realized it will come through the idea which the chisel of Bartholdi has immortalized, and which the _World_ has been chiefly instrumental in providing with a local habitation and a name on Bedloe’s Island. European monarchs are now trembling on their thrones, which are doomed to crumble into ruins at no distant day, through the very idea which ‘The Statue of Liberty Enlightening the World’ is destined to propagate from this day forward in its imposing position in our spacious harbor. The Israelites of old were cured of their bodily maladies by gazing at a serpent erected on a pole. In a similar way the politically afflicted and oppressed of all nations, as soon as they emerge through the narrows of our magnificent bay, either by day or night, will find a panacea for all their ills in the sight of that wonderful statue, with all that its name implies.
“And one word as to what is in that name which has been so severely criticised. On account of it Americans have been charged with egotism, but those who talk in this way seem to forget that Bartholdi himself, as the representative of the French nation, is the author of the name. So, as it comes from him in his representative capacity, we can receive it with good grace, and without being amenable to any such charge as that referred to. Taken, with all its broad, historical associations, I don’t think the name is at all too pretentious. I have no hesitation in predicting that, ere the present century draws to a close, results will fully justify the assumption.
“The magnificent gift of the French people, and the years of toil and study which Bartholdi has devoted, gratis, to his unprecedented labor of love, cannot fail of the great and only reward which both have so earnestly and magnanimously sought, namely—to enlighten the world.”
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CHAPTER XLVIII
LARGE FORTUNES AND THEIR DISPOSITION.
HOW THE FORTUNES OF THE ASTORS WERE MADE.—GEORGE PEABODY AND HIS PHILANTHROPIC SCHEMES.—JOHNS HOPKINS AND HIS PECULIARITIES.—A. T. STEWART AND HIS ABORTIVE PLANS.—A SCULPTOR’S OPINION OF HIS HEAD.—ECCENTRICITIES OF STEPHEN GIRARD, AND HOW HE TREATED HIS POOR SISTER.—HIS PENURIOUS HABITS AND GREAT DONATIONS.—JAMES LENOX AND THE LIBRARY WHICH HE LEFT.—HOW PETER COOPER MADE HIS FORTUNE, AND HIS LIBERAL GIFTS TO THE CAUSE OF EDUCATION.—SAMUEL J. TILDEN’S MUNIFICENT BEQUESTS.—THE VANDERBILT CLINIC.—LICK, CORCORAN, STEVENS AND CATHARINE WOLF.
I shall take a short review in this chapter of some of the most prominent wealthy men who have been the architects of their own fortunes, and comment briefly on their methods of disposing of their estates.
In the United States, John Jacob Astor was one of the first to arrest public attention in the matter of large fortunes. Before his day there were few, if any, millionaires on this side of the Atlantic. Now there are thousands of these lucky individuals. It is true, George Washington, the Father of our country, was very comfortably fixed, and supported aristocratic style in his domestic life, but he probably never was worth more, all told, than $200,000. It is singular that none of his successors have ever been worth even this amount. It was believed at one time that Grant had accumulated a large amount of money and value, and was fast approaching the financial status of a millionaire, but this popular delusion was suddenly dispelled when he and his family were victimized by the first young Napoleon of finance, Ferdinand Ward.
The founder of the now wealthy house of Astor and of the Astor Library died in 1848, at the age of 85. He left the greater bulk of his estate to his son, William B. Astor. He bequeathed $400,000 to the Astor Library, also a few legacies, amounting in all, the library inclusive, to about $500,000. His wealth, at the time of his death, was estimated at twenty millions, a very large fortune at that time.
William B. Astor, who died in 1875, left $250,000 to the library, and the large balance of his estate to his sons and widow.
The Astors have been characteristic for their benefactions, in a quiet way, to a large number of public objects. Their estate is remarkable for the way it has been kept intact, and for its steady and considerably rapid improvement, and they are popular as landlords.
The elder Astor who came to this country from Waldorf in Germany, near Heidelberg, before he was 20 years of age, and who started in life dealing in furs, had a grand scheme on foot at one time for monopolizing the fur trade of the whole world, which he had calculated would then have brought him a million dollars a year. He was diverted from this purpose by the large profits which he found in real estate, by dealing in which he made most of his money; and the family has steadily adhered to this line of speculation and investment through two generations.
The native American who, perhaps, ranks above all others in the munificence of his gifts, and the beneficence of his purpose was George Peabody. He was a poor Massachusetts boy, who, by hard industry, arose to be one of the largest millionaires of his day. He was also a philanthropist in the highest sense of the term. His fortune at one time probably exceeded ten millions. His well-known benefactions, during his life, exceeded seven million dollars, and it is supposed that he gave away vast amounts in charity of which no definite account was kept.
Shortly before his death, in 1869, he bequeathed two and a half millions as a building fund for lodging houses for the poor of London, and devised for a Southern Education Fund two million one hundred thousand. In addition to these he left five millions to various relatives. J. S. Morgan, who was Mr. Peabody’s partner in the banking business, became, at his death, his successor, and is now supposed to be a richer man than Mr. Peabody ever was.
Johns Hopkins, who died at Baltimore in 1873, at the age of 78, was one of the most eccentric millionaires and philanthropists. Very few expected that he would bequeath the great university and the hospital which are called by his name. He was so wretchedly penurious that he hardly afforded himself the means of subsistence. His benefactions to these two institutions, however, exceed eight million dollars.
Alexander T. Stewart, the great dry goods merchant, who was reputed to be one of the three wealthiest men in the United States, Commodore Vanderbilt and John Jacob Astor being the other two, died in 1876. He had no legitimate heirs, and his estate, estimated at one time between twenty and thirty millions, was left to his wife, with the exception of a million to Judge Hilton and $325,000 to his employes.
Mr. Stewart’s two great benefactions were failures, as he left nobody able and willing to carry out his intentions in regard to their arrangement.
They would probably have been failures in any event, as they seemed to the majority of people to be in a large measure Utopian. One was Garden City on Long Island, intended to be homes for industrious mechanics on a higher and more comfortable scale than the majority of the dwelling of these sons of physical and intellectual toil. A grand cathedral was built there in memory of the merchant prince, and a beautiful crypt for his mortal remains, which were stolen from St. Mark’s churchyard shortly after the interment.
The mechanics and laborers were not attracted to Garden City, and it is now making slow progress with tenants whose avocations are generally in the higher walks of life.
The other great enterprise was a home for girls and women at moderate expense. This was in the shape of a hotel on a large scale at Park Avenue and Thirty-third street. The restrictions and the prices were such that the home also failed to attract the class it was intended for. The public gift, therefore, reverted to the Stewart estate, or rather was taken forcible possession of by the trustees and transformed into the Park Avenue Hotel. To carry out the rather indefinite terms of the bequest would probably have involved the expenditure of a very large amount of the Stewart estate, and, perhaps, the enterprise would even then have been a failure. It is more than probable that if Mr. Stewart had lived a few years longer, he himself would have been satisfied with the impracticability of both his semi-philanthropic schemes.
There were great things expected in the shape of benefactions from Mr. Stewart at the time of his death. He had done so little in that respect while living that the public indulged the hope that he would make up for his charitable shortcomings when he found that his worldly accumulations could no longer be of any service or gratification to him, and that he could not take any of them away with him.
Hence, it was a considerable disappointment to the public when the will revealed the fact that nothing had been devised, out of the immense hoard of nearly half a century’s savings, to charitable purposes.
On the day of his death I had an engagement with my dentist, Mr. Dwinell, in Thirty-fourth street, and while I was seated in the chair Mr. Wilson MacDonald, the well known sculptor, came in to pay a visit to the dentist, with whom he was well acquainted. Having been introduced by the sculptor, we immediately entered into conversation on the prominent local topic of the day, the death of Mr. Stewart and the probable distribution of his wealth.